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Current spam filtering techniques classify email based on
content and IP reputation blacklists or whitelists. Unfortu-
nately, spammers can alter spam content to evade content-
based filters, and spammers continually change the IP ad-
dresses from which they send spam. Previous work has sug-
gested that filters based on network-level behavior might be
more efficient and robust, by making decisions based on how
messages are sent, as opposed to what is being sent or who
is sending them.
This paper presents a technique to identify spammers
based on features that exploit the network-level spatio-
temporal behavior of email senders to differentiate the spam-
ming IPs from legitimate senders. Our behavioral classifier
has two benefits: (1) it is early (i.e., it can automatically
detect spam without seeing a large amount of email from
a sending IP address—sometimes even upon seeing only a
single packet); (2) it is evasion-resistant (i.e., it is based on
spatial and temporal features that are difficult for a sender
to change). We build classifiers based on these features us-
ing two different machine learning methods, support vec-
tor machine and decision trees, and we study the efficacy
of these classifiers using labeled data from a deployed com-
mercial spam-filtering system. Surprisingly, using only fea-
tures from a single IP packet header (i.e., without looking at
packet contents), our classifier can identify spammers with
about 93% accuracy and a reasonably low false-positive rate
(about 7%). After looking at a single message spammer
identification accuracy improves to more than 94% with a
false rate of just over 5%. These suggest an effective sender
reputation mechanism.
1. INTRODUCTION
Current spam filtering systems commonly employ two
complementary mechanisms: content filters and sender rep-
utation. Although content filters are effective at blocking
certain classes of unwanted email messages, they are also
quite brittle. For example, spammers can evade content fil-
ters by embedding messages in images or other file formats
(e.g., PDF, MP3); as a result, network administrators may
have an incredibly difficult time maintaining content filters.
Accordingly, spam filters also rely on sender reputation to
filter messages: in other words, they use the reputation of
the sender to help determine whether the message being sent
is legitimate or spam, sometimes even as a means for filter-
ing email before it is even accepted for delivery.
A common approach to IP-based filtering is the use of
DNS blacklists (DNSBLs), e.g. SpamHaus [6]. DNSBLs
maintain lists of IP addresses that are known to send spam,
which is based on information retrieved from spam traps and
manual listings by humans. Unfortunately, DNSBLs have
several shortcomings. First, the reaction time for IP ad-
dresses being listed on an DNSBL is slow. This is due to
the fact that a spammer either needs to send a message to a
spam trap used by an DNSBL or a human needs to manually
list a spamming IP address. Therefore, there may be sig-
nificant delay between the time when a spammer becomes
active and the time when that spammer is ultimately listed
in an IP blacklist. Second, the IP addresses of email senders
is continually changing due to dynamic addressing, newly
compromised hosts that might be used to send spam, etc.
Thus, due to the slow reaction time, DNSBLs often times
are not able to react on fast enough. Although content-based
spam identification methods have been extensively studied
[15, 16] and are quite mature, methods based on network-
level behavior of spammers are relatively less developed.
This paper presents SNARE (Spatio-temporal Network-
level Automatic Reputation Engine), a sender reputation sys-
tem that can quickly, accurately, and automatically classify
email senders based on features that can be determined early
in a sender’s history—sometimes even upon seeing only a
single packet. The key insight underlying SNARE’s repu-
tation mechanism is to classify senders based on how they
are sending messages (i.e., traffic patterns), rather than who
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the senders are (i.e., their IP addresses). Such features are
typically more invariant, because it is more difficult for a
spammer to change the mechanism for sending messages
than it is to send messages from a fresh set of IP addresses;
by focusing on such features, SNARE can potentially be
more evasion-resistant than existing sender reputation mech-
anisms.
Despite the appeal of relying on invariant “network-level”
features that can be used to build an automated classifier,
the major challenge of identifying which features most effi-
ciently and effectively distinguish spammers from legitimate
senders remains. In particular, ideally our system should
have the following properties:
• Accurate. It should accurately distinguish spammers
from legitimate senders.
• Early and adaptive. It should be able to classify
senders based on minimal historical information.
• Evasion-resistant. It should be based on features that
are difficult for a sender to evade.
This paper evaluates eleven different network-level features
that require varying levels of information about senders’ pre-
vious history.
We evaluate SNARE using information about email
senders collected from Secure Computing’s TrustedSource,
a commercial reputation system that filters spam for more
than 8,000 distinct domains. We categorize SNARE’s fea-
tures according to four categories, in increasing order of
efficiency: (1) those that rely only on historical activity
from other senders but not the sender in question; (2) those
that require limited historical information from the sender;
(3) those that require at least 24 hours of historical informa-
tion about the sender in question. Surprisingly, using only
features from a single IP packet header, SNARE can identify
spammers with more than 90% accuracy with a reasonably
false-positive rate for sender reputation (7%). The prediction
accuracy on spammers improves to more than 94% with a a
low false-positive rate of about 5% with features extracted
from a single message. Additionally, our analysis of the
rules extracted from the decision tree classifier shows that
the combination of geodesic distance between the sender
and the recipient and the email server density around the
sender is very effective in separating out a lot spam senders
from legitimate mail servers. Our results also suggest that
SNARE might ultimately be deployed as a sender reputation
system in conjunction with other tools (e.g. content-based
filters) and used as a first-pass filter.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents background on existing sender reputation systems
and a possible scenario where SNARE’s algorithms could
be deployed. Section 3 presents an overview of the net-
work level behavioral properties of spammers and legiti-
mate senders used in SNARE’s classification algorithms and
presents first-order statistics concerning these features. Sec-
tion 4 describes how we incorporate these behavioral fea-
tures into two different classifiers: a decision tree, and a
support vector machine. Section 5 evaluates SNARE’s per-
formance using different feature subsets, ranging from those
that can be determined from a single packet to those that re-
quire varying amounts of history. Section 8 describes related
work, and Section 9 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide background on existing sender
reputation mechanisms and present motivation for improved
sender reputation mechanisms. We also describe Se-
cure Computing’s TrustedSource system, which is both the
source of the data used for our analysis and a possible de-
ployment scenario for SNARE’s classification algorithms.
2.1 Blacklists and Email Reputation Systems
Today’s email spam filters traditionally perform lookups
to DNS-based IP blacklists (DNSBLs) to determine whether
a specific IP address is a known source of spam at the
time of lookup). One commonly used public blacklists is
Spamhaus [6], which maintains three main blacklists: the
SBL is a list of known spam sources, the XBL is a list that
enumerates hosts believed to be compromised with third-
party exploits (such machines can often serve as open prox-
ies and have been known to send spam), and the PBL is a
“policy block list”, which enumerates IP addresses that are
typically not allowed to make connections to mail servers
(e.g., dynamic IP address ranges). Other blacklist operators
include SpamCop [5] and SORBS [4].
These blacklists are typically called DNS-based blacklists
because they provide a DNS interface for querying specific
IP addresses. A spam filter might issue a DNS query for
an IP address 10.0.0.1 by sending an A-record query for
1.0.0.10.sbl.spamhaus.org. If the IP address is
not blacklisted, the query will return an NXDOMAIN. If, on
the other hand, the IP address is listed, the DNSBL will re-
turn an IP address, where different IP addresses reflect sta-
tuses.
Current blacklists have many shortcomings. First, they
only provide information based on IP addresses. Unfortu-
nately, as an earlier work has observed [23], the IP addresses
of senders are dynamic: roughly 10% of spam senders on
any given day have not been previously observed. This study
also observed that many spamming IP addresses will go in-
active for several weeks, presumably until they are removed
from IP blacklists. This level of dynamism makes main-
taining responsive IP blacklists incredibly difficult; they
are also often coarse-grained, blacklisting entire prefixes—
sometimes too aggressively—rather than individual senders.
One goal of SNARE is to develop a reputation system that is
both automated and faster than existing blacklists. Second,
IP blacklists are typically incomplete. A previous study has
noted that as much as 20% of spam received at spam traps is
not listed in any blacklists [22]. Finally, anecdotal evidence




ts server name Name of server that handles the query
ip score Score for the queried IP
score Score for the message based on a combina-
tion of IP score and a content-based score
source ip Source IP in the packet (DNS server relaying
the query to us)
device serial Serial number of the device that sent the
query
query ip The IP being queried
body length Length of message body
count taddr Number of To-addresses
Table 1: Description of data used from the Secure Com-
puting dataset.
being incorrectly blacklisted (e.g., because they were reflect-
ing spam to mailing lists). At this point, several commer-
cial reputation systems exist that take additional data such
as SMTP meta data or message fingerprints into account to
address these shortcomings [7].
Previous work introduced the idea of “behavioral black-
listing” and developed a spam classifier based on a single
behavioral feature: the number of messages that a particular
IP address sends to each recipient domain [23]. Although we
do incorporate this feature into some version of SNARE, we
note that this feature has several shortcomings. First, it is not
as responsive as other features, because it requires each can-
didate sender to send messages to several recipient domains
before it can be accurately classified. Second, it is not par-
ticularly evasion-resistant: spammers could potentially ran-
domize (or continually change) the recipient domains that
each sending IP address targets.
This paper builds on the main theme of behavioral black-
listing by finding better features that can classify senders ear-
lier and are more resistant to evasion.
2.2 Secure Computing TrustedSource
This section describes Secure Computing’s TrustedSource
reputation system. We describe how we use the data from
this system to evaluate SNARE’s classification algorithms.
We also describe how SNARE’s algorithms might be incor-
porated into a real-time sender reputation system such as
TrustedSource.
TrustedSource is a commerical reputation system allow-
ing lookups on various Internet identifiers such as IP ad-
dresses, URLs, domains, or message fingerprints. It gets
query feedback from various different device types such as
mail gateways, web gateways, and firewalls.
2.2.1 Data
We evaluated SNARE using a subset of two full days of
data from the query logs from Secure Computing’s Trust-
edSource system. Table 1 summarizes the fields that we
use to develop and evaluate SNARE’s classification algo-
rithms. Each received email generates a lookup to the Trust-
edSource database, so each entry in the query log essentially
represents information about a received email message. The
timestamp field reflects the time at which the message
was received at a TrustedSource appliance in some domain;
the source ip field reflects the source IP of the machine
that issued the DNS query (i.e., the receiving appliance);
device serial reflects the identity of the spam filtering
appliance that issued the query. We use device serial
as a substitute for the recipient domain, since we do not have
a field that explicitly represents the receiving domain. The
query ip field is the IP address being queried (i.e., the
IP address of the email sender). We use many of the other
features in Table 1 as input to SNARE’s classification algo-
rithms. Due to the sheer volume of the full set of logs, we
used data from one specific TrustedSource server logs, as
opposed to using the data from all the servers.
The data contains a ip score field that indicates how
TrustedSource ultimately scored the sender based on its cur-
rent reputation system (essentially, either spam, legitimate
email, or uncertain). We use the ip score as ground truth
labels to train SNARE. Our goal is to develop a fully au-
tomated classifier that is as accurate as TrustedSource but
relies only on early, evasion-resistant network-level features
that can be extracted at low cost on commodity hardware.
2.2.2 Deployment scenario
Because it operates only on network-level features of
email messages (i.e., it does not use email contents for either
training or classification), SNARE could be deployed either
as part of TrustedSource or as a standalone DNSBL. As with
TrustedSource, however, email servers that issued lookups to
SNARE would have to issue modified DNS queries that con-
tained additional meta-data about the received messages.
3. NETWORK-LEVEL BEHAVIORAL
PATTERNS
In this section, we explore some important spatio-
temporal properties of email senders and discuss why these
properties are relevant and useful for diferentiation between
spammers and legitimate senders. We also consider how
these behaviors can yield different kinds of features depend-
ing on the amount of history available from any specific
sender. Table 2 summarizes all the features that can be ex-
tracted using only non-content information about the mes-
sages and with varying amount of available historical data.
We describe these features in terms of increasing overhead.
Section 3.1 describes features that can be determined with
no previous history from the sender the SNARE is trying to
classify, and given only a single packet from the IP address in
question; Section 3.2 describes features that can be gleaned
from a single SMTP message header; Section 3.3 features
that can be derived with varying amounts of history (i.e., ag-
gregates of other features). Note that no particular feature
needs to be perfectly discriminative between ham and spam
on its own: SNARE’s classification algorithm (described in
Section 4) uses a combination of these features to build the
3
best classifier. We evaluate classifiers using different sets of
these features in Section 5.
3.1 Single Packet
In this section, we discuss some properties that can help
identify a spammer even when we have not seen the particu-
lar IP address (we will call it candidate IP) before, but some
history of network-level activities of other email servers is
available. We first discuss the features that can be extracted
from just a single IP packet: the geodesic distance between
the sender and receiver, sender neighborhood density and
probability ratio of spam to ham at the time the IP packet
arrives. Next we discuss other features that can be extracted
from a single message: the number of recipients in the mes-
sage, and the length of the message.
3.1.1 Sender-receiver geodesic distance
Recent results [8, 14] suggest that social networking struc-
ture among communicating parties could be utilized to effec-
tively isolate spammers. The challenge with this approach is
to find features that can be calculated quickly on the wire
and deployed in a practical system. To this end, we hypothe-
size that the legitimate emails tend to travel shorter distances
in geographic terms, whereas the distance traveled by spam
will be random. In other words, a spam message may be just
as likely to travel a short distance as across the world.
Figure 1(a) shows the distribution of the distance between
the sender and the target IP addresses for each of the five
categories of messages. The distance used in these plots
is the geodesic distance, that is, the distance along the sur-
face of the earth. It is computed by first finding the physi-
cal latitude and longitude of the source and target IP using
the MaxMind’s GeoIP database [18] and then computing the
distance between these two points. These distance calcula-
tions assume that the earth is a perfect sphere. For certain
ham 90% of the messages travel about 2200 miles or less.
On the other hand for certain spam, only 25% of messages
stay within this range. In fact if we look at the 90% level,
the messages travel more than 6000 miles, which is a quarter
of the earth’s circumference at the equator. Based on these
plots, geodesic distance certainly looks like a feature that can
be used to distinguish spam from ham and can be computed
quickly using just a single IP packet.
3.1.2 Sender neighborhood density
A large percentage of spam messages today is generated
by botnets [22, 26]. For messages originating from the same
botnet, it can be expected that the infected IP addresses all lie
close to each other in the numerical space, very likely within
the same subnet. One possible way of detecting whether an
IP belongs to a botnet is to look at the past history and de-
termine if messages have been received from other IPs in
the the same /xx subnet as the current sender, where xx can
be determined experimentally. If we find many different IPs
from the same subnet, the chances that the whole subnet is
infested with bots are very high. The problem with this ap-
proach is that the frame of reference is limited to a subnet
and the lookup does not transcend the subnet boundaries.
A better measure of email server density in an IP’s neigh-
borhood is the distances to its k nearest neighbors. The dis-
tance to the k nearest neighbors can be computed by treat-
ing the IPs as set of numbers from 0 to 232 − 1 (for IPv4)
and finding the nearest neighbors in this single dimensional
space. We can expect these distances to exhibit different
patterns for spam and ham. If the neighborhood is crowded
these neighbor distances will be small indicating possible
presence of botnet. On the other hand if the IP is not part
of local botnet, then we shouldn’t see too many IPs within
short distances. Another benefit of this measure is that it also
pulls out IP addresses that are operating in isolated parts of
the IP space.
Figure 1(b) shows the average distance to the first twenty
nearest neighbors in the historical log for each category of
senders. The plots reflect the fact that a large majority of
spam originates from botnets which have high email server
density in a given IP region. The distance to the kth near-
est neighbor for spam tends to be much shorter on aver-
age than it is for legitimate senders. This is the opposite
of geodesic distance measure where the distances for the le-
gitimate senders tend to be smaller than those for spammers.
The plots also confirm the intuitive sense that this is a feature
that can help identify spamming botnets and therefore distin-
guish spamming IPs from legitimate senders quite well.
3.1.3 Time of day
Another feature that can be extracted using information
from single IP packet is the message timestamp. The time of
message arrival could potentially bias the decision towards
either spam or ham. Can the timestamp be used to influence
this decision? To make this analysis accurate, the timestamp
for each message has been corrected to correspond to the
time at the sender’s physical location, as opposed to Coordi-
nated Universal Time (UTC) used in the log.
Figure 2(a) shows the relative percentage of messages of
each type at different times of the day. Here again the legit-
imate senders and the spam senders show different diurnal
patterns. Two times of the day are particularly striking: the
relative amount of ham tends to ramp up quickly at the start
of the work-day and peaks early morning. It goes down rel-
atively quickly as well at the end of the work day. On the
other hand spam goes up at a slower steady pace, probably
as machines are switched on in the morning. The increase in
relative volume for spam could also be later if the bots use a
lot of home machines that switch on later. The spam volume
stays steady through the day and starts dropping around 9:00
pm, probably when machines are switched off again.
To utilize the timestamp as a feature, the probability ratio
of spam to ham, at the time of the day when the message is
received is used. This ratio is calculated for each hour of the
day as follows:
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Single Message Features Aggregated Features
Feature (Section in text) Single-Packet Header Message 2+ Messages 1+ Days
Features that Do Not Require History
Geodesic distance between the sender and recipient (3.1.1) Any Any Any — —
Number of recipients (3.1.4) — Any Any — —
Message length in bytes (3.1.5) — — Any — —
Features that Require History only from Other Senders
k nearest neighbors of the IP (in numerical space) (3.1.2) 1+ Hour 1+ Hour 1+ Hour 1+ Hour 1+ Hour
probability ratio of spam to ham at the time of message (3.1.3) 1+ Day 1+ Day 1+ Day — —
Features that Require History from the Candidate Sender
Mean and variance of geodesic distance (3.2.1) — — — Any Any
Mean and variance of number of recipient (3.2.1) — — — Any Any
Mean and variance of message size (in bytes) (3.2.1) — — — Any Any
# messages sent to 100 most frequent target domains (3.2.2) — — — 1+ Hour 1+ Hour
Time-series of number of messages in fixed-size bins (3.2.3) — — — — Any
Time-series of number of bytes in fixed-size bins (3.2.3) — — — — Any
Table 2: The set of all the features used in SNARE.































(a) Geodesic distance between the sender and recipient’s geo-
graphic location











































(b) Average of numerical distances to the 20 nearest neighbors
in the IP space
Figure 1: Spatial differences between spammers and legitimate senders
spam probability (or ham probability) =
# of spam (or ham) messages received in the given hour of
the day / Total number of spam (or ham) messages received
over the whole day(s).
The probability ratio is then simply
spam probability / ham probability .
When a new message is received, the precomputed spam to
ham probability ratio for the corresponding hour of the day
can be looked up and used as a feature. This ratio can be
recomputed on a daily basis.
3.2 Single Header and Single Message
Once connection request gets accepted, and the SMTP
header and subsequently, the compete message are received,
additional non-content features can be extracted. We discuss
two of these possible features that could be used for spam-
mer identification below.
3.2.1 Number of recipients
The features discussed so far can be extracted from a sin-
gle IP packet from any given specific IP address combined
with some historical knowledge of messages from other IPs.
Another feature available without looking into the content
is the number of address in “To” field of the header. This
is a feature that can be extracted after receiving the whole
SMTP header but before accepting the message body. Fig-
ure 3 shows the distribution of number of addresses on the
“To” field for each category of messages. Both the axes are
on log-scale to focus the plot on the smaller values where
most of the data is concentrated. Based on this plot and
looking at the actual values, it appears that if there are very
large number of recipients on the “To” field (100 or more),
then the message is almost certainly not spam. Beyond that,
there doesn’t seem to be a significant difference between the
different types of senders for this measure. The noticeable
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(a) Number of messages sent at different times of the day
































(b) Number of bytes transmitted at different times of the day

















Distribution of number of addresses on the "To" field

























Figure 3: Distribution of number of addresses listed on
the “To” field for each category
differences around 4 to 12 addresses are in fact very small,
given that this is log-scale. So this feature is not expected to
be useful in telling spammers apart and we will validate this
experimentally in the next section.
3.2.2 Message length
Once an entire message has been received, the email body
size in bytes is also known. Since a given spam sender will
mostly send same or similar content in all the messages, it
can be expected that the variance in the size of messages sent
by a spammer will be lower than among the messages sent
by a legitimate sender. To stay effective, the spam bots also
need to keep the message size small so that they can max-
imize the number of messages they can send out. As such
the spam messages can be expected to be biased towards the
smaller size. Figure 4 shows the distribution of messages for
each category. The spam messages are all clustered in the
1Kb-10Kb range whereas the distribution of message size
for good senders is more evenly distributed. Consequently,
the message body size is another property of messages than
can help differentiate between ham and spam.
3.3 Aggregate Features
The behavioral properties discussed so far can all be con-
structed using a single message. If some of history from an
IP is available, some aggregate IP level features can also be
constructed. We now discuss these in the following subsec-
tions.
3.3.1 Mean and variance of single-message features
With availability of information about multiple messages
from a single IP, the overall distribution of the following
measures can be captured by using a combination of mean
and variance:
1. geodesic distance between the sender and recipient
2. number of addresses in the “To” field of the SMTP
header
3. message body length in bytes
By virtue of summarizing behavior over multiple mes-
sages and over a time interval, these aggregate features will
likely yield a more reliable IP reputation prediction. On the
flip side, these come at the cost of increased latency as we
need to collect a number of messages before we compute
these. By averaging over multiple messages they may also
smoothen out the structure of the feature space and possibly








































































Figure 4: Histograms of message sizes for the different
categories of messages
3.3.2 Distribution across recipient domains
Another property of messaging IPs that can be extracted
at an aggregate level is the number of messages sent to a
set of target domains by a particular IP. Ramachandran et
al. [23] used this feature in the design of the SpamTracker
system, based on their earlier finding [22] that many spam-
ming senders distribute spam across multiple domains to
keep the volumes at each individual domain low and hence
evade detection. So, monitoring the number of email vol-
umes from each sender across a set of target domains should
be useful in identifying these kind of spammers. To con-
struct this feature we identify all the target domains that had
received messages over the two days of data used for eval-
uation, then picked the top 100 domains that had received
most number of emails. Finally, for each IP we counted the
number of messages sent to each domain over a twenty-four
hour duration.
3.3.3 Timeseries of message volume
As Figure 2 shows, the spam senders clearly have a more
smoothly varying message volumes over the day when com-
pared to the legitimate senders. If we have accumulated log
of messages from an IP for 24 hours or more, these can be
used to construct a time-series of:
1. number of emails sent in each time-interval.
2. number of bytes sent in each interval.
When constructing a time-series, one challenge is the
choice of appropriate time interval for binning the data.
Manually selected bin widths may not give the best
performance—statistical methods that minimize some rele-
vant loss function to obtain the optimal bin size may be more
appropriate. We investigated a promising automated binning
method, autoPSTH [24]), to determine the optimal bin-width
for each type of timeseries.
The autoPSTH determined optimal bin-width of 39 min-
utes was compared with three other manually selected bin
sizes of 30, 60, and 180 minutes. Timeseries were con-
structed using each bin-width and single day of data and
used to train a classifier. The prediction accuracy of the
trained classifiers was evaluated to determine the most suit-
able bin-width. Ultimately, the best performance was ob-
tained using 3 hour bins. This is the bin-size we use in this
paper. Aparently, autoPSTH’s objective function does not
yield bin widths that are also optimal for classification.
4. MACHINE LEARNING METHODS
With a better understanding of the behavioral differences
between the spam and ham at the network level , we can de-
sign an IP reputation system that utilizes these differences.
Since we have labeled data, a supervised machine learning
method to classify spam and ham is most appropriate. We
evaluate and compare spam filters built using two such clas-
sifiers, Support Vector Machine (SVM) [10] and Decision
Tree [20], each chosen for its different strengths in relation
to this problem. Though there are many other classifiers that
could have been applied, these represent the two most inter-
esting points in the space of classifiers; SVM is most accu-
rate, decision tree is most interpretable. Before discussing
the rationale behind the choice of these two classifiers, we
provide a brief introduction to these below.
4.1 Support Vector Machine
For a binary classification problem, a Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM) algorithm constructs a maximum margin hy-
perplane to separate the data points of the two classes. Given
n data points and their class labels {(x1, y1),...,(xn, yn)},
where each xi is a vector of attributes or features, SVM train-
ing involves solving a quadratic programming problem and







yiαi(x · xi) + b
]
.
When the given data is not separable by a hyper-plane,
one can first non-linearly transform the set of input training
vectors x1, ...,xn into a higher dimensional feature space
using a map Φ(xi) 7→ zi and then do a linear separation in
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yiαiK(x · xi) + b
]
where K(x.xi) = Φ(x).Φ(xi) is known as a kernel.
Notice that training and classification procedures now in-
volve computing high dimensional dot products of the form
Φ(x).Φ(xi). To avoid these computations we consider only
those classes of Φ that reduce to simple kernel function K.
Often, only a small fraction of the αi coefficients are non-
zero. The corresponding pairs of xi entries (known as sup-
port vectors), yi output labels, αi coefficients, and offset b
fully define the decision function and are preserved for use
in the classification procedure.








where σ is a parameter that needs to be tuned.We use Gaus-
sian kernel because it is widely used in the machine learning
literature as the default kernel, has demonstrated excellent
performance on a range or classification problems and in-
volves only a single tweak parameter, σ. The SV M light
[17] implementation is used for training the SVM classifier.
4.2 Decision Tree
Decision tree algorithm builds a decision tree from a set
of labeled training data {(x1, y1),...,(xn, yn)}. As before,
each data point xi is a vector of attributes. Decision tree al-
gorithm constructs a classification tree by successively split-
ting the data into smaller subsets along a selected attribute.
In particular, C4.5 [21], the decision tree algorithm we use
in this study, uses the information gain criterion to choose














where k is the number of target classes (2 in our case), Si is
the subset of data points at node i, |Si| is number of points
in Si and freq(Cj , Si) is the number of points of class j in
the set Si. At any given node, the attribute with the highest
normalized information gain is the one used to make deci-
sion at that node. Each of the leaf nodes correspond to one
of class labels. Classifying a new data point involves simply
traversing a path through the tree based on the values of the
features and predicting the class as the label of the leaf node
on the traversed path.
4.3 Choice of Learning Algorithm
Support vector machines choose themselves for any clas-
sification problem since they have been the standard bearers
for prediction accuracy over the last decade. They have been
shown empirically to give good generalization performance
on a wide variety of problems such as handwriting recog-
nition, face detection, text categorization, etc. On the other
hand, they do require significant parameter tuning before the
best performance can be obtained. An appropriate kernel
needs to chosen and the best parameters to for that kernel
need to be determined experimentally. The worst case train-
ing time of SVM can be O(N 3), where N is the number of
training points. Additionally, if the training set is large and
big percentage of αi turn out to non-zero, the classifier itself
can take up lot of storage space and the classifying new data
points will be correspondingly slower since the classification
cost is O(S) for each test point, where S is the number of
support vectors.
Decision tree algorithms have been popular classification
method for almost two decades since they possess certain de-
sirable properties; the resulting classifier is simple to under-
stand and interpret, they are able to easily handle both con-
tinuous and discrete feature values, and the trained classifier
scales well with the number of training samples, with the
prediction on a new test point being O(log(n)), where n is
the number of nodes in the trained tree. Decision tree is also
faster to train with training cost of O(NlogN). On the other
hand, a decision tree algorithm may not beat a well tuned
support vector machine in terms of prediction accuracy, es-
pecially when all the features are continuous (and not mixed
or discrete). Given that our feature set is a mixture, with
many features that are count values and hence discrete and
others that are continuous, decision trees are overall prefer-
able in this context.
We further discuss how these difference manifest them-
selves in our problem and their implications in our discus-
sion section when we compare their performance on the rep-
utation prediction problem.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section we evaluate the performance of SNARE
using different levels of information that result in a reputa-
tion prediction system with different level of responsiveness,
right from identification using a single packet to more a more
reactive reputation score using historical data.
Across the board the support vector machine had sig-
nificantly better performance when the features were log-
transformed before training the SVM. Hence, for all the ex-
periments in this paper, the logarithm of the features is used
to train SVMs. All the classifiers are evaluated using 10-fold
cross-validation. This is done by splitting the dataset into 10
subsets, training on 9 subsets of the data and using the re-
maining subset as a test set. Different test set is used in each
of the 10 rounds and the prediction accuracy and false pos-
itive rates are calculated as the average of the 10 folds. The
term false-positive rate is used to indicate the percentage of
legitimate senders that were classified as spammers.
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Table 3: SNARE performance using single IP packet
5.1 Single Packet
When a mail server receives a new connection request,
the server can provide SNARE with the IP addresses of the
sender and the recipient and the time-stamp. Recall from
Section 3 even if SNARE has never seen this IP before, it can
still combine this information with recent history of behavior
of other email servers and construct the following features:
• geodesic distance between the sender and the recipient,
• distances to k nearest neighbors of the sender in the
log, and
• probability ratio of spam to ham at the time the con-
nection is requested
5.1.1 Predictive performance of SVM & Decision Tree
To evaluate the effectiveness of these features, we trained
both support vector machines and decision trees on these
features. The number of nearest neighbors used to train
the classifier were also varied to determine its effect on pre-
diction accuracy. Table 3 shows the confusion matrices for
the different configurations. The best spammer identifica-
tion rate and false positive rate for each type of classifier is
highlighted in bold.
The classifier built using a decision tree and trained using
20 nearest-neighbors has a surprisingly strong performance.
It correctly identifies almost 93% of the spamming IPs while
having a reasonably low false-positive rate. Just over 7% of
legitimate IPs get labelled as spammers. This is a signif-
icant result since it uses features constructed from limited
amount of data and just a single IP packet from the candi-
date IP. Sender reputation system will be deployed in con-
junction with a combination of other techniques including
content based filtering. As such, as a first line of defense,
this system will be very effective in eliminating a lot of un-
desired senders. In fact once a sender is determined to be
spammer, the mail server does not even need to accept the
connection request, saving network bandwidth and compu-
tational resources.
Table 3 also shows that decision tree tends to perform bet-
ter than support vector machines for this set of features. This
could possibly be due to the fact that we have a mixture
of discrete and continuous features, whereas the Gaussian
kernel assumes all the features to be smoothly varying con-
tinuous features. Unfortunately, there is no default support
vector machine kernel that can effectively handle mixed at-
tributes well.
As for the appropriate choice of k of the nearest neighbor
distances, while the decision tree and SVM predictions im-
prove noticeably as we increase k from 6 to 10, the improve-
ment is not that significant when k is increased from 10 to
20, especially for the decision tree. So, it is reasonable to
conclude that increasing the number of neighbors beyond 20
will not get us a much improved performance, but it will in-
crease the dimensionality of the training points and hence the
complexity of the trained classifier. With increased dimen-
sionality, correspondingly more training points will also be
needed to train the classifier. Consequently, we use k = 20
for rest of this paper.
5.1.2 An additional benefit: Evasion-resistance
An important advantage of SNARE is that the combination
of attributes is difficult for spammers to modify; hence, the
resulting reputation mechanism is evasion-resistant, as we
discuss below.
Geodesic distance: The distribution of geodesic distances
between the spammers’ physical location and their target
IP’s location is a result of the spammers’ necessity to reach
as many target mail boxes as possible and in the shortest pos-
sible time. If they had to modify their behavior so that their
geodesic distances are biased towards their neighborhood,
they will be limited to predominantly spamming domains
that are hosted on servers located in a physical vicinity. This
will severely limit the ability of botnets as they will need to
infect machines in each region of the world that they need to
send messages to.
Nearest neighbor distances: Nearest neighbor distances
is another feature set that will be hard to modify. Distances
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Table 4: SNARE performance using features from a single header and single message
to k nearest neighbors effectively isolate existence of unusu-
ally large number of email servers within a small sequence
of IP addresses. If the spammers try to alter their neighbor-
hood density, they will not be able to use too many machines
within a compromised subnet. This will significantly reduce
the IP space available to infect with bots and disrupt the abil-
ity of spam bots to proliferate.
Time of day message probability: This is one feature
which appears to be less resistant to evasion tactics com-
pared to the previous two. Having said that, spamming bot-
nets’ diurnal pattern is tied to when the infected machines
are switched on. For botnets to modify their diurnal mes-
sage volumes over the day to match the legitimate message
patterns, they will have to lower their spam volume in the
evenings, especially between 3:00 pm and 9:00 pm and also
reduce email volumes in the afternoon. This will again re-
duce the effectiveness of the botnets to send large amounts
of email.
Overall, in combination, these three behaviors are quite
difficult to modify without significantly reducing the effec-
tiveness of spam-bots. They are also easy to compute and
don’t have a high computational or storage requirements,
making this version of SNARE straightforward to deploy in
a practical sender reputation system.
5.2 Single Header and Single Message
Single packet features allow SNARE to rapidly identify
and drop connections from spammers even before looking
at the message header. Once a mail server has accepted
the connection and examined at the whole message, we can
make further determination of sender reputation with in-
creased confidence. As described in Section 3.2, these fea-
tures include the number of recipients and message body
length.
Table 4 shows the prediction accuracy for each kind of
classifier when we combine the features from the previous
section with these additional features. As the results from
Section 3 suggest, adding the message body length to the fea-
ture improves SNARE’s performance noticeably. The ability
to identify spammers improves and the false-positive rates
drop, irrespective of which classifier is used. This is a satis-
fying result and it allows for balancing resource availability
and responsiveness with performance.
Addition of number of recipients to the set of features
clearly does not help. It is somewhat expected that this fea-
ture will not add any new discrimination power since the
number of recipients listed on the “To” field can easily be
limited to one by putting the target email addresses on “Cc”
and “Bcc” fields. Besides, if the spammers always place a
single recipient address in the “To” field, this value is go-
ing to be same as the large majority of legitimate messages.
This experiment only validates this intuitive fact. Since we
did not have logs of additional fields in the SMTP header
beyond the count of email addresses on the “To” field, we
could not evaluate whether considering number of recipients
listed under “Cc” and “Bcc” headers will make this a useful
feature to consider.
5.3 Aggregate Features
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of aggre-
gate features constructed by combining history from mul-
tiple messages from a single sender. With the exception of
distances to k nearest neighbors, the rest of the features here
will be different from the previously evaluate per-message
features since values from multiple messages are aggregated.
If multiple messages from a sender are available, the follow-
ing features, in addition to k nearest neighbor distances, can
be constructed:
• the mean and variance of geodesic distances, message
body lengths and number of recipients.
• the number of messages sent to each of top d most fre-
quently targeted domains. (In our experiments, d =
100.)
If we have logs of IP messaging behavior for 24 hours or
more, we can also construct:
• a timeseries of the number of messages sent in each
interval over the course of the day
• a timeseries of the number of bytes transmitted in each
interval
Table 5 shows the performance of the two classifiers with
these aggregate features. There are few interesting obser-
vations here; (1) the prediction accuracy obtained using ag-
gregate features is not significantly better than the one earlier
10




















Table 5: SNARE performance using aggregate features computed using multiple messages from a single sender
obtained from single message, (2) addition of the time-series
features slightly deteriorate the prediction accuracy instead
of improving it, (3) the support vector machine now outper-
forms the decision tree in terms of false-positive rate.
An extremely surprising and counterintuitive result is that
aggregate features do not yield superior performance, de-
spite incorporating more information. There may be many
possible explanations for this. One possible reason is the in-
crease in dimensionality of the feature space and decrease
in the number of available training data points. The dimen-
sionality of the feature space now increases five-fold. At the
same time, the actual number of training points available to
train the classifier using history over a fixed period decreases
as multiple log entries are aggregated into a single feature
vector. This means that the classifier is being trained in a
much higher dimensional feature space using fewer training
points. As a result, the classifiers overfitted the training data
which was evident from the very high prediction accuracy on
training set (close to 99%). Additionally, the target domain
distribution and time-series features will also tend to be very
sparse for large proportion of the senders. Most of the spam-
mers and legitimate senders will likely not send high volume
of messages from a single IP in any given observation pe-
riod. So, we may not see messages to most of the domains
that form part of our feature set. At the same it is infeasible
to use message counts to all the target domains that are in
the logs as that will only result in even higher dimensional
and more sparse feature vectors.
The addition of time-series features causes the prediction
accuracy to deteriorate for the similar reasons of sparsity and
increased dimensionality. Further, neither of the classifiers
used in this study account for the autocorrelation between
consecutive bins as they essentially treat each bin as an in-
dependent feature. In fact, there no existing classifiers that
do this in a reasonable way. Better exploitation of temporal
autocorrelation in the two time-series suggested here to im-
prove the prediction accuracy is something we are currently
investigating.
Finally, even though the decision tree classifier identifies
more spammers correctly, the support vector machine has a
better false-positive rate in this case. As such, support vector
machine is a better classifier to use with aggregate features.
6. RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF FEATURES
In this section we use the the fact that decision trees pro-
duce interpretable rules to understand the relative impor-
tance of the features we have examined in Sections 3 and 4.
Table 6 shows the the six most frequently used prediction
rules for each class, accounting for 37.3% of ham data points
and 54.6% of spam data points respectively. It is important
to remember these rules are just illustrative and don’t pro-
vide a complete picture of the overall decision tree structure.
Table 6 shows that two features—the geodesic distance
between the sender and the recipient and the distances to
the k nearest neighbors—play an important role in separat-
ing out a large fraction of spammers from good senders.
This result is quite promising, since, as per our discussion
in Section 5.1.2, these features are also evasion resistant and
lightweight (they can be gleaned from a single packet, as-
suming history about neighboring IP addresses is available).
The rules also show that the classifier accounts for legit-
imate server groups that might have a sequence of IP ad-
dressess next to each other (for example, spam rule 2 and
ham rule 1), which might otherwise resemble a group of
compromised hosts on a subnet. The spam-to-ham proba-
bility also appears among these top rules, demonstrating the
fact that incorporating time of the day is helpful in improv-
ing prediction. The classifier also captures the fact that the
body length of the messages sent by spam senders is usually
not very large.
Rule 1 for spammers is remarkable: On one hand, it is in-
teresting that the decision tree generated a rule that appears
to be based on a large spam campaign (based on the fact that
it is weeding out messages of a common size). On the other
hand, it is also a cause for concern, because such rules could
result in false positives; such a rule is also easy to evade. In
our current system this rule worked well as the correspond-
ing leaf node had a purity of 99.7%, i.e. 99.7% of data points
covered by this rule had a spam label. In a deployed system,
it would be straightforward to assign weights to the features
and adjust the information gain criteria accordingly, so that
features that could be more prone to evasion do not play a
dominant role in the classification role. Additionally, the
class probability at each of the leaf nodes [28] can be used
as a confidence score. SNARE can provide this confidence
11
Rules for Spam Rules for Ham




# points: 5177 (8.62%)
purity : 99.7%







# points: 1936 (3.23%)
purity : 99.5%






# points: 3160 (5.27%)
purity : 99.6%







# points: 1462 (2.44%)
purity : 99.3%







# points: 3233 (5.38%)
purity : 99.8%






# points: 1490 (2.48%)
purity : 99.7%






# points: 2077 (3.46%)
purity : 99.3%






# points: 1418 (2.36%)
purity : 99.4%





# points: 3064 (5.11%)
purity : 99.7%






# points: 1476 (2.46%)
purity : 98.7%




# points: 1668 (2.78%)
purity : 99.8%
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Glossary:
geo dist = Geodesic distance in miles
nst nbrk = distance to the kth nearest neighbour in IP space
# points = number of training points covered by the rule
mesg size = Message Size in bytes
pr ratio = Probability ratio of spam to ham at the time of day
purity = % of points in the leaf node from the target class
Table 6: Six most frequently used classification rules for each class extracted from the decision tree
score to the mail server which can then use its own thresh-
olds to decide whether to block the IP straightaway or sub-
ject it to further scrutiny.
7. VALIDATION AGAINST BLACKLIST
We performed a preliminary validation against IP ad-
dresses listed in the SpamHaus blacklist to investigate
whether some of SNARE’s misclassifications are in fact ad-
ditional spammers that SNARE had caught. We used the
Secure Computing data from October 22 and queried the
19,610 IP addresses from the training set with aggregrate
features. Of these, 9,805 had a high spam score in the Se-
cure Computing data. SpamHaus blacklist data from Octo-
ber 1, 2007 to May 8, 2008 was used for this lookup. Out
of the original 9,805 IP addresses, 6,508 were listed in the
SpamHaus blacklist by October 22, and an additonal 101
were added after that date. The SVM classifier misclassi-
fied 564 of the senders labelled as legitimate senders in the
training data. We queried these misclassified IPs against the
Spamhaus blacklist and discovered that 11 of these were ac-
tually listed in the SpamHaus blacklist in October. Two of
these were removed and then added back into the blacklist
after October 22nd. Nevertheless, these low numbers sug-
gest that either SpamHaus continues to miss some of the IP
addresses that SNARE labeled as spam, or our false positives
are in fact misclassifications.
8. RELATED WORK
SNARE is motivated by recent studies that have helped un-
derstand the network-level behavior of spammers, botnets,
dynamically assigned IP space and the relationship among
these. It is also closely related to systems for content inde-
pendent spam filtering and sender reputation determination.
We discuss some the related works for each area below.
Characterization studies. Recent characterization stud-
ies have provided increasing evidence that spammers’ have
some distinct network-level behavioral patterns and helped
strengthen the case for devising techniques for automated
sender reputation system using network behavioral patterns.
Ramachandran et al. [23] used data from a single spam trap
and showed that spammers utilize transient botnets to spam
at low rate from any specific IP to any domain. Xie et al. [27]
discovered that a vast majority of mail servers running on
dynamic IP address were used solely to send spam and ac-
counted for more than 42% of all emails received at Hot-
mail. In their recently published study [26], they demon-
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strate a technique to identify bots by using signatures con-
structed from urls in spam messages. They also showed that
emails from a botnet are often sent in a highly synchronized
fashion and that hosts within the same botnet exhibit similar
sending patterns. Their signature based botnet identification
is different from SNARE’s reputation system in that it uses
the message content whereas SNARE does not use any con-
tent. Pathak et al. [19] deployed a relay sinkhole to gather
data from multiple spam senders destined for multiple do-
mains. They used this data to demonstrate how spammers
utilize compromised relay servers to evade detection. They
also showed the separation between the high volume stan-
dalone spammers and low volume senders that are coordi-
nated with each other. While this work also used data from
multiple vantage points, the data is somewhat different from
ours since it was collected from a sinkhole and consisted
mostly of spam messages.
Sender reputation. The SpamTracker [23] system is
most closely related to SNARE in using network level behav-
ioral features from data aggregated across multiple domains
to build a behavioral reputation system. While that work
initiated the the idea of behavioral blacklisting, we have dis-
covered in the course of designing SNARE that there are sev-
eral other behavioral features that are better suited for sep-
arating spammers from legitimate senders, when compared
to the distribution of messages across recipient domains that
was used as a feature in SpamTracker. Tang et al. explored
the detection of spam senders by analyzing the behavior of
IP addresses as observed by query patterns [25]. Their work
focuses on feedback retrieved from IP address lookups by
analyzing the breadth and the periodicity of message vol-
umes in relation to sources of queries. There are also several
commercially deployed IP reputation systems that are simi-
lar in spirit to SNARE that are part of a bigger spam filtering
system. For example Secure Computing [2] and IronPort [1]
deploy spam filtering appliances to hundreds or thousands
of domains which then query the central server for sender
reputation and also provide meta-data about messages they
receive. As we noted earlier our data is in fact obtained from
these kind of logs gathered by the Secure Computing servers
and we intend to ultimately deploy SNARE as part of Secure
Computing’s TrustedSource[3] sender reputation system.
Non-content Spam Filtering. The Trinity system [9] is
designed to be a distributed, content-free spam detection sys-
tem for messages originating from botnets. It uses message
count volumes to determine whether an email could have
originated from a bot. This system can potentially be used
as component of SNARE to provide additional features.The
SpamHINTS project [13] also has the stated goal of build-
ing a spam filter using analysis of network traffic patterns
instead of the message content. Clayton’s earlier work on ex-
trusion detection involves monitoring of server logs at both
the local ISP[11] as well as the remote ISP [12] to stop re-
laying of spam messages and detect spam senders. While
this work has similar objectives as ours, the methods pro-
posed under spamHINTS focus more on properties related
to SMTP sessions from a single sender.
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Although there has been much progress in content-based
spam filtering, state-of-the-art systems for sender reputa-
tion are relatively unresponsive, incomplete, and coarse-
grained. Towards improving this state of affairs, this pa-
per has presented SNARE, a sender reputation system that
can quickly, accurately, and automatically classify email
senders based on features that can be determined early in
a sender’s history—sometimes after seeing only a single IP
packet. SNARE’s classification algorithms achieve 93% de-
tection rate and only a 7% false-positive rate when looking
at only a single IP packet from a sender, without having any
prior history about the sender. Using additional lightweight
features, SNARE can detect about 94% of spam with only
a 5% false positive rate. These results suggest that SNARE
might ultimately be used as a sender reputation system that
is used as a first-pass filter for email filtering systems. The
false-positive rate may still likely be too high to be used in
some practical systems; therefore, a future challenge will be
to further reduce false positives, or to figure out how to in-
corporate SNARE into an email system where such a false
positive rate is tolerable (e.g., one that forces senders to retry,
delays all suspected spam, etc.).
In addition to presenting a first-of-its kind automated clas-
sifier based on early, evasion-resistant features, this paper
has presented several additional contributions. First, in Sec-
tion 3, we presented a detailed study of various spatial and
temporal characteristics of both spammers and legitimate
senders, as well as an examination of how well each fea-
ture distinguishes spammers from legitimate senders. Sec-
ond, in Section 6, we presented a detailed analysis of the
relative importance of each of the features we studied. Our
results are surprising and encouraging: Some of the most
important features for distinguishing spammers from legit-
imate senders are those that can be gleaned from a single
packet. This result was surprising because intuition would
suggest that more information would produce a better clas-
sifier. This result was also very encouraging: it suggests that
the strongest features for distinguishing spammers from le-
gitimate senders may, in fact, be the most lightweight and
robust ones as well.
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